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T HE more important litigation for the past year has concerned
the construction and interpretation of lease provisions. Sev-
eral important decisions were made construing common provisions
of oil and gas leases.
COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION AND PRODUCTION
Leases generally provide that the lease will expire at the end
of the primary term unless there has been either production or
commencement of operation. The question of what acts of the
lessee are sufficient to comply with the provisions in the lease is
often a difficult one. In an Arkansas case' the question arose as
to what acts constituted a compliance with the provision that the
lessee "shall commence drilling operations" before the expiration
of the primary term, a provision found in a standard oil and gas
"Commencement Form Lease." Drilling had begun a few days
before the lease expired with a rig that was inadequate to reach
the oil-bearing strata. The court held these actions sufficient, using
the tests of good faith and diligence. Good faith was held to in-
clude an intention to drill to the production depth and the expendi-
ture of $5,000 seemed to indicate this intent, and the lessee had
the right to wait until the last day before expiration of the lease
to commence drilling operations. The test of diligence was met by
the operators up to the time when they were notified by the lessors
of their attempted cancellation and operations were excused after
that time. When a production clause was in litigation in Texas
it was held to include production by means of swabbing;' and in
Oklahoma production was held to mean produced in paying quan-
tities to the lessee though the well might never repay its costs and
might prove unprofitable.' In the latter case it was further held
that while production created only a limited estate for the duration
of production in paying quantities yet if at any time thereafter
there was a close question of whether production was in paying
1 Haddock v. McClendon, ----.Ark ....... 266 S.W. 2d 74 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep.
1219.
2 Upshaw v. Norsworthy, 267 S.W. 2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error rel., n.r.e.,
3 Oil and Gas Rep. 1558.
3 Henry v. Clay -..... Okla ....... 274 P. 2d 545 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 1713.
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quantities, the lessee would not suffer forfeiture of his lease on
that account alone.
FORCE MAJEURE
In a case arising in Louisiana4 the lease contained a provision
which defined force majeure as including ". . . lack of labor or
means of transportation of labor or material; Acts of God; insur-
rection; flood; strike." The question presented was whether the
Louisiana seasonal rains were a force majeure within the meaning
of the provision and it was held that they were not. The lease
contained another provision excusing operations by the lessee for
six months after the cessation of the force majeure and had the
lease been construed as contended for by the lessee this period
and the rainy seasons would overlap so that the lessee would have
been able to hold the lease perpetually without any activity on
his part.
FRACTION PROBLEMS
A frequently litigated question is whether an instrument entitles
the conveyee to a fractional interest of gross production free of
costs or whether he is entitled only to that fraction of the royalties,
i.e., whether he has a royalty interest or a mineral interest. The
question is often resolved in favor of the one interest or the other
depending upon which express incidents of the one or the other
are also stated to have passed with the fractional interest. The
owner of an interest in the mineral estate may execute leases and
share in bonuses, delay rentals, and other payments and rights
besides his share of the royalty payments while the owner of a
royalty interest is entitled only to his share of gross production,
free of costs. Therefore when there was a reservation of a "Three
Thirty seconds (3/32) interest in all crude oil that may hereafter
be produced and saved .. ." it was held to be a reservation of a
royalty interest because there were no other rights reserved besides
an interest in oil produced and saved.5 But when there was a con-
veyance of the right to share in all future "bonuses, rents and
4 Logan v. Blaxton, -La,.-, 71 So. 2d 675 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 791.
5 Casteel v. Crigler, -.-. Okla..----, 266 P. 2d 643 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 440.
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royalties, and other benefits which may accrue" then a mineral
interest was held to have been conveyed.6
DIVISIBILITY OF LEASES
The Louisiana cases, notably Hunter v. Shell Oil Co.,7 have indi-
cated that a lease contract is indivisible, but a recent case' reached
a contrary result in a suit brought to cancel a particular portion
of the original lease for failure to develop. The court distin-
guished prior cases and decided this case on the particular lease
provisions involved, a provision that the lessee might release any
portion of the premises held by him and have his rentals reduced
proportionately and a provision that upon termination of the lease
for any cause the lessee might retain a certain area around each
well.
ENTIRETY PROVISION
The Texas Supreme Court in Thomas Gilrease Foundation v.
Stanolind Oil and Gas Co.9 considered a case of first impression
involving the construction of an entirety provision. Stanolind had
taken a lease with an entirety provision included. The provision
was that "[i]f the leased premises are now or shall hereafter be
owned in separate tracts" then the premises should be developed
and operated as one lease with each lessor receiving royalties in
the proportion that the acreage which he owned bore to the entire
leased acreage. This type provision is inserted for the benefit of
the lessee so that there might be no controversy raised over whether
the lessee should have to drill further wells on land under lease for
the benefit of lessors who have no interest in the particular tract
where the well is located. The Foundation in this case owned an
interest in the tract from which production was being had in
volume, but owned a greater interest in a tract from which produc-
tion was being had in considerably less volume. Stanolind con-
tended that the phrase "owned in severalty or in separate tracts"
6 Surety Royalty Company v. Sullivan, ----Okla ...... 275 P. 2d 259 (1954), 3 Oil and
Gas. Rep. 2073.
7 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
8 Eota Realty Company v. Carter Oil Co.,La.., 74 So. 2d 30 (1954), 3 Oil
and Gas Rep. 1876.
9 ---- Tex -..... 266 S.W. 2d 850 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 673.
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referred only to the situation where the lessor owned an interest
in one portion of the lease but not in another (the usual situation
the provision is designed to cover is where there are conveyances
by the lessor subsequent to the execution of the lease so that the
leased premises are owned in separate tracts by different owners)
and not the situation where the lessor owned interests, though of
different quantum, in all portions of the lease. But the court de-
cided that the provision was applicable to the situation presented
and the Foundation was held entitled to receive royalties in pro-
portion to their total interest in the land under lease.
SUBLEASE UNDER "WASHOUT" PROVISION
A lessee who assigns with an overriding royalty provision may
wish to protect himself from an intentional termination of the
lease on the part of the assignee who would like a new lease with-
out the overriding interest. The lessee may protect himself by the
means of a "washout" provision which provides that the over-
riding interest is to be a part of all future leases taken by the
assignee on the lands covered by the original lease, which the
assignee may take within a certain period of time from the expira-
tion of the original lease. In Berman v. Brown"0 the conveyee of the
lessee, under a conveyance containing a "washout" provision appli-
cable to the conveyee's successors and assigns, made a further
conveyance of the lease and retained a further overriding interest.
The working interest was then burdened with 5/16 outstanding
royalty interests. For this reason there was a failure to develop
or pay delay rentals and the lessor was successful in a suit for
cancellation of the lease. Less than two months after the judgment
of cancellation the operator took out another lease and the inser-
tors of the "washout" provision sued for their overriding royalty.
The court held on rehearing that the retention of the second over-
riding royalty caused that conveyance to be a sublease and not an
assignment, by reason of the reservation of the royalty, and that
therefore there was no privity of contract between the operator
and the insertors of the "washout" provision and consequently no
liability to them.
10 .__La- .-.. 70 So. 2d 433 (1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 608.
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ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
A case of possible far reaching importance was decided in
Oklahoma, involving the question of absolute liability for the
injection of salt water." Plaintiff alleged as one of his causes of
action that by reason of the injection of salt water by defendant,
plaintiff was unable to recover a large footage of casing. Defend-
ant appealed from a verdict and judgment thereon in favor of
plaintiff. Defendant did not assign as error any question of negli-
gence and the court upheld the decision below on the ground that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of trespass, the
injection being found to be the cause of plaintiff's inability to re-
cover his casing; to meet the defendant's assignment of error that
there was no sufficient showing of trespass to support an action
for damages.
In an earlier Oklahoma case, not mentioned by the court, the
theory of absolute liability for damage caused by water entering
the oil stratum with consequent flooding of plaintiff's well was
expressly rejected. 2 But in that case there was no injection, rather
only a flooding from upper strata due to a collapsed casing in
defendant's well. However, the flooding was aggravated by inac-
tion on the part of the defendants due to their efforts to recover
their casing. The court did not impose liability, saying, "[d] efend-
ants only owed plaintiffs the duty to use every means a prudent
operator would adopt to stop the flow of water..."
When salt water was injected into a salt water stratum on plain-
tiff's land, as a means of disposal, the Oklahoma court refused to
impose liability."3 But that opinion indicates that if damage had
been caused, liability would have followed. The court stated that
... defendants admit and agree that in the event their injection
of salt water into the well should in any way injure or damage
plaintiffs they would be liable .. ."
11 West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard -...... Okla ....... - P. 2d (1954),
3 Oil and Gas Rep. 1426.
12 Larkins-Warr Trust v. Watchorn Petroleum Co., 198 Okla. 12, 174 P. 2d 589
(1946).
18 West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Assn. v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226 P. 2d 965
(1950).
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PRUDENT OPERATOR RULE
The prudent operator rule in Oklahoma has been considerably
confused since the decision in Doss Oil Royalty v. Texas Co. 4
The decision in that case was to the effect that the lapse of an
unreasonable length of time without any further development after
the expiration of the primary term would justify cancellation of
the lease whether a reasonably prudent operator would drill or not.
Several cases arose in the past year which applied the prudent
operator rule. The first was Blake v. Texas Co.1 in which Judge
Wallace makes an extensive survey of the development of the rule
and sums up the present Oklahoma law. As presented in the Blake
case there are three aspects of the rule as now constituted: (1)
when the delay is irrebuttably unreasonable then the court may
cancel the lease without a consideration of the profitability of
further development, (2) when the delay is sufficient to be prima
facie unreasonable then the lessee must rebut the prima facie
showing with evidence of conduct as a prudent operator, and (3)
when the time delay is not prima facie unreasonable then the les-
sor must establish that the lessee has failed to measure up to the
standard of a prudent operator. In the Blake case a delay of seven
years in drilling a second well was held to fall into category (2),
but the operator met the burden placed upon him by showing little
likelihood of profit and diligent efforts to obtain further infor-
mation.
When only one well had been drilled in twenty years and fur-
ther drilling was refused on the basis of a dry hole drilled by the
operator and one drilled twenty years earlier by other parties the
court decreed cancellation.' 6 The court apparently thought that
the facts of the case placed it in category (1), since the produc-
tion from the one well was small and the dry holes would indicate
an unlikelihood of further production, thus justifying a refusal
to drill if the standard of the prudent operator alone were con-
14 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d 934 (1943).
15 123 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Okla. 1954), 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 2051.
16 Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, .---Okla ------- ,276 P. 262 (1954), 4 Oil and Gas
Rep. 60.
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sidered. The other cases" were placed in category (2) although
in the Magnolia case there was a delay of twenty-six years with
only the drilling of a required offset well. In that case cancellation
was decreed on the basis of evidence to the effect that further pro-
duction could be obtained and Magnolia had expressly refused
to further develop when the trial court offered to decree a condi-
tional cancellation. In the Castleberry case a seven year delay was
considered unreasonable by the court for the purposes of argu-
ment only, but cancellation was refused because the only evidence
in the record was that of the operator to the effect that additional
wells would not be profitable and the court considered that de-
fendant had discharged the burden of the evidence placed upon
him by the delay.
NECESSARY PARTIES
Since the decision in Veal v. Thomason"s the Texas courts have
ruled that whenever title is litigated to a tract of land in a pooled
unit, all parties to the unit are necessary parties to the suit. In
Fussell v. Rinque19 an alternative is presented to making all of
the parties to the pooling agreement parties to the suit. In that
case the court overruled such an objection as to parties when both
sides to the controversy recognized the validity of the unit.
Bill Masterson.
17 Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Wilson, 215 F. 2d 317 (10th Cir. 1954), 3 Oil
and Gas Rep. 2065; Trawick and Boddie v. Castleberry, ----Okla .. ,275 P. 2d 292
(1954), 4 Oil and Gas Rep. 63.
18 Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W. 2d 472 (1942).
19 269 S.W. 2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error rel., n.r.e., 3 Oil and Gas Rep. 1758.
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